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Young children copy cumulative 
technological design in the absence 
of action information
E. Reindl  1, I. A. Apperly1, S. R. Beck1 & C. Tennie1,2
The ratchet effect – the accumulation of beneficial changes in cultural products beyond a level that 
individuals could reach on their own – is a topic of increasing interest. It is currently debated which 
social learning mechanisms allow for the generation and transmission of cumulative culture. This study 
focused on transmission, investigating whether 4- to 6-year-old children were able to copy cumulative 
technological design and whether they could do so without action information (emulation). We 
adapted the spaghetti tower task, previously used to test for accumulation of culture in human adults. 
A baseline condition established that the demonstrated tower design was beyond the innovation 
skills of individual children this age and so represented a culture-dependent product for them. There 
were 2 demonstration conditions: a full demonstration (actions plus (end-)results) and an endstate- 
demonstration (end-results only). Children in both demonstration conditions built taller towers than 
those in the baseline. Crucially, in both demonstration conditions some children also copied the 
demonstrated tower. We provide the first evidence that young children learn from, and that some of 
them even copy, cumulative technological design, and that – in line with some adult studies – action 
information is not always necessary to transmit culture-dependent traits.
Humans’ capacity to spread across the planet and to reach out beyond its boundaries has often been explained 
with their ability to produce cumulative culture, i.e., to accumulate changes in cultural traits beyond a level that 
individuals can reach on their own1, 2. These changes entail both improvements and deterioration, as well as 
changes that have no effect on trait efficiency. However, it is our capacity to accumulate beneficial modifications 
over time – a phenomenon labelled the ratchet effect3, 4 – that is thought to be among the key characteristics 
setting us apart from other animals, including culture-bearing species such as chimpanzees and orangutans3. 
Identifying the cognitive processes underpinning the ratchet effect will help us understand more about how 
human culture has evolved.
Researchers have begun to experimentally investigate the cognitive mechanisms involved in cumulative cul-
ture: Methods have been developed to simulate cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory, e.g., behavioural 
experiments using the transmission chain paradigm5–12 or virtual tasks investigating the effects of social learning 
in groups13, 14. These studies show that human adults readily exhibit a ratchet effect. In conjunction with other 
experimental studies15–17 and modelling approaches18, 19 these findings suggest that one crucial prerequisite for 
the ratchet effect is the capacity for high-fidelity social transmission, alongside a capacity for innovations20 and 
other relevant cognitive mechanisms21.
High-fidelity social learning is essential for the transmission of cumulative culture in both the social and the 
technological domain22. The current study focuses on the technological domain as material culture has played 
a crucial role for the evolution of our species8, 23, 24. Over evolutionary time, our ancestors increasingly relied on 
technology to solve problems, which was likely both the result of and the driving force for the evolution of ever 
more faithful cultural transmission mechanisms. This co-evolution of faithful social transmission and material 
culture has resulted in the creation of the human “technological niche”25.
Which social learning mechanisms enable the occurrence of a ratchet effect? Many social learning mecha-
nisms such as stimulus or local enhancement are capable of supporting culture over extended time, yet they have 
been argued to be of insufficient fidelity and bandwidth to accumulate culture26, 27. In these cases, the learning 
mechanisms draw the learner’s attention towards a stimulus/location, after which the behaviour in question is 
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acquired through individual learning. The acquisition of the trait is thus more an individual response than a 
faithful copy. Consequently, the range of traits that a learner can acquire by this combination of low-fidelity social 
learning and individual learning is limited to those that the learner can actually invent individually4. Cultural 
traits that are too complex or unlikely to be reinvented individually – traits that we label culture-dependent traits 
– cannot – by definition – be acquired by mechanisms that only harness the power of individual learning (such 
as stimulus and local enhancement)26. Instead, culture-dependent traits need high-fidelity copying to be trans-
mitted, e.g., copying of the actions involved and/or end-results produced. It has been argued, and demonstrated, 
that cumulative culture can be transmitted via imitation, i.e., transmission where action copying plays a role1, 3, 
4, 9, 12–14, 17, 28. Whether emulation, i.e., learning only about effects (or “results”) in the environment29, can ever be 
sufficiently faithful to sustain a ratchet effect is still debated6, 7, 10, 17, 27, 30.
The general capacity for high-fidelity social learning is within the human cognitive repertoire from an early 
age31: Before the end of their first year, infants are able to copy novel actions32; by 1 year, they flexibly switch 
between emulation and imitation33, 34 and by the end of their second year, children imitate even causally irrele-
vant actions35–40 (overimitation41) – a propensity argued to be highly adaptive in an environment of cognitively 
opaque cultural artefacts and skills24 (in fact, the tendency to overimitate extends well into and throughout 
adulthood)42–45. Given the special role high-fidelity copying plays for cumulative culture, young children clearly 
already possess some crucial cognitive prerequisites for acquiring and transmitting cumulative culture.
However, so far no study has investigated children’s ability to learn from or even copy cumulative culture in the 
technological domain. This is surprising as the acquisition of technological skills is an important form of cultural 
transmission in our species, responsible for the vast amount and complexity of technology accumulated today. 
Therefore, our study examined children’s capacity for copying cumulative technological design. We define tech-
nological design as a material cultural product created by a sequence of instrumental actions, i.e., actions which 
“bring about a tangible, functional outcome”22, whereby the actions are causally – i.e., non-arbitrarily – linked 
to this outcome. The creation of technological design is a subtype of instrumental skills22: Instrumental skills 
are those that achieve functional outcomes by either arbitrary (e.g., typing in a number combination to unlock 
a phone) or non-arbitrary (e.g., levering to open a box) actions (with arbitrary actions requiring the learner to 
pay relatively more attention to the actions compared to the results of the demonstration). Technological design 
represents the group of products that are created by non-arbitrary actions only, and thus are inherently more 
results-focused.
Previous studies on children’s social learning often aimed to differentiate between imitative and emulative 
learning31, 46, thus testing children’s motivation and ability to act on and/or manipulate parts of the environment 
based on demonstrations. None of these studies tested for the recreation of technological design. Nevertheless, 
they provide important insights into children’s copying behaviour, many of which are relevant to understanding 
the acquisition of (cumulative) technological design. The studies that come closest to testing children’s capacity 
to copy culture-dependent traits investigated children’s ability to copy social conventional22, as opposed to instru-
mental, acts. Social conventional acts are usually those in which the relationship between the outcome and (parts 
of) the actions is not causal, but arbitrary (thus conventional)34, 37, 41, 47, 48 (e.g., driving on the left or the right side 
of the road, tapping the side of a box before opening it). Acts can also be interpreted as social conventional if they 
contain obviously inefficient actions33, 49 (e.g., switching on a light with your forehead rather than your hand) or 
if the start states and end states of these acts do not differ50. These studies show that from their second year of life 
children are able to copy novel conventional acts. As some of these behaviours were not shown spontaneously by 
the children (i.e., without having received a demonstration), e.g., turning on a light with the head49, these behav-
iours might even represent social-conventional culture-dependent traits for children.
While previous studies have tested for children’s ability to copy social conventional culture-dependent traits, 
the question of children’s capacity for learning from and copying technological culture-dependent traits (cumu-
lative technological design) remains unanswered. Conclusions drawn from studies involving social conventional 
actions may not apply to the technological domain, not least because in the latter both imitation and emula-
tion may be important51, 52. For example, technological demonstrations allow the learner to gain information by 
attending to endstates as well as intermediate states. Therefore, in contrast to social conventional demonstrations, 
learners could focus only on the outcome and then reproduce it using their own means (so-called endstate emu-
lation29). Technological tasks also allow learners to combine action and results copying, resulting in greater trans-
mission fidelity than that which copying a single type of information alone would be able to achieve (“redundant 
copying”51). Thus, social conventional and technological demonstrations differ systematically with regard to the 
social learning mechanisms that can be involved, which likely has implications for the transmission of cumulative 
culture.
Young children use imitation and emulation to perform instrumental tasks even before their first birthday32, 
33, 53, 54. However, the target actions/results in previous studies have only consisted of simple actions/results or 
combinations of those that participants in baseline conditions were able to invent on their own. Thus, they did 
not meet the requirements for culture-dependent traits (that no individual can and does show the trait in question 
without demonstrations). Our study is the first to look at children’s ability to copy culture-dependent traits in the 
technological domain.
We investigated young children’s ability to copy a technological culture-dependent product (cumulative tech-
nological design) and whether children required action information to do so (or whether seeing only the results 
was sufficient). For this, we adapted the spaghetti tower task previously used to study aspects of cumulative cul-
tural evolution in adults5. In contrast to previous studies on children’s social learning in instrumental tasks15, 46, 
53–55 we showed that the demonstrated trait (building a “tripod” design, see below) was not invented by children 
spontaneously.
In Pilot study 1 (see Supplementary method: Pilot study 1) we tested children between 4 and 6 years and 
showed that this age range was suitable for the adapted tower construction task. In order to present children 
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with a culture-dependent product, i.e., a product that “no individual could invent”26, we needed to establish what 
children of that age can achieve on their own given the materials provided: In Pilot study 2 (see Supplementary 
method: Pilot study 2 and Supplementary Table S1) we examined children’s baseline performance by asking 17 4- 
to 6-year-olds to build something “as tall as possible” using plasticine and sticks. Based on these data, we created 
our cumulative technological design: a construction that was not spontaneously invented by the baseline children.
In cumulative cultural evolution, changes to a technological product can occur in two domains21, 56: In its 
complexity/design (in our case the shape of the construction) and in its efficiency (the height of the construction). 
We focused on the design aspect and chose as our cumulative technological design a tripod – a tower with a base 
of three legs arranged in a triangle (rather than, e.g., in a line) and combined at the top with a piece of plasticine 
(Fig. 1). Cumulative culture is inherently open-ended56 and the tripod operationalizes this aspect by being a hier-
archical and open-ended cultural product: The order of the building actions is determined through a hierarchy 
(e.g., “first construct the tower base, then build upwards. For the base, first form the plasticine, then insert the 
sticks, etc.”); at the same time the number of possible steps is not limited by the task (open-ended). We chose a 
hierarchical task as “most cultural products are compound products (p. 285)”57, requiring a “lengthy sequence 
of actions […] with each action functionally dependent on previous actions (p. 3801)”58. In sum, instead of pre-
senting children with simple actions/results or combinations of those as has been the case in previous studies, we 
presented children with a cultural recipe58.
The tripod represents a superior design compared to other tower designs, as it allows for greater heights to 
be achieved. Evidence comes from studies using the spaghetti tower task with adults which have identified the 
tripod as one of the most efficient designs invented by participants7, 59. Moreover, Caldwell and colleagues7 found 
a positive relationship between the number of tripod design features that participants’ constructions exhibited 
and the height of these constructions; such a relationship was absent for a cubic design, suggesting that the tripod 
allows for greater heights to be achieved, and so comes closer to the notion of open-endedness. These studies also 
found that participants who were shown a tripod design were themselves able to build constructions that were as 
tall as59 or even significantly taller7 than the demonstrated tripod, whereas participants presented with a different 
(cubic) design were not able to go beyond the demonstrated height. Note that the fact that the tripod is superior 
Figure 1. Demonstration tower (tripod). Example of the cumulative technological design children in the 
demonstration conditions were presented with (h = 46 cm).
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to many other designs does not imply that participants choosing the tripod design will always make towers that 
are taller than other shapes.
Pilot study 2, in which we established children’s baseline performance, also included a second condition (full 
demonstration condition, hereafter full demo condition) in which a new group of children observed the exper-
imenter making a tripod before they built their own construction. Results showed that children between 4 and 
6 years were able to copy the tripod from this action plus endstate demonstration, and is thus the first evidence 
for young children’s ability to copy cumulative technological design (see Supplementary method: Pilot study 2).
The study presented here had three goals: First, to replicate the findings from Pilot study 2: i) that children 
in a baseline condition would not produce a tripod on their own, and ii) that children in a full demo condition 
would be able to copy the tripod design. This replication was important because in Pilot study 2 we did not col-
lect the data for the two conditions simultaneously (because by design, baseline data had to be collected first) 
and thus comparability of these two conditions might have been impaired. In addition, and more generally, the 
reproduction of novel findings is crucial to enhance their credibility – especially when a study is the first of its 
kind60. Second, we aimed to investigate whether children would also be able to copy cumulative technological 
design when they lacked information about the actions involved in producing the tripod. For this, we added to 
the baseline and full demo condition a third condition, an endstate-only demonstration condition (hereafter 
endstate-only demo condition). Lastly, we also introduced small improvements to our general methodology (see 
Supplementary Method: Pilot study 2). This study contributes to our understanding of human culture in shed-
ding first light onto the ontogenetic origins of how children use social and technical information when acquiring 
technological culture-dependent traits.
Results
Tower height. Across conditions, children’s average tower height was 25.05 cm (SD = 11.68 cm), ranging 
from 0.3 to 45.5 cm. In the baseline, tower height was on average 17.84 cm (SD = 10.60 cm, range 0.3–41.0 cm); 
in the full demo condition, it was 28.07 cm (SD = 10.96 cm, range 15–45.0 cm), and in the endstate-only demo 
condition it was 28.62 cm (SD = 10.68 cm, range 2–45.5 cm). Pictures of children’s towers can be found in 
Supplementary Tables S3–S5, histograms of the heights reached in the three conditions are displayed in Fig. S1.
Overall, sex, age in months, and condition (baseline, full demo, endstate-only demo) together had a clear effect 
on the height of children’s towers (comparison full-null model: F(4, 68) = 5.339, p < 0.001). Specifically, tower 
height was significantly affected by condition (F(2, 68) = 7.992, p < 0.001; R2 = 0.19). Children in the full demo 
condition built towers that were on average 10.65 cm (SE = 3.12; 95% CI [4.43; 16.87]) taller (p = 0.001), and 
children in the endstate-only demo condition built towers that were 10.51 cm (SE = 2.98; 95% CI [4.56; 16.45], 
p < 0.001) taller than the towers built in the baseline. Tower height did not differ between the two demo condi-
tions (estimate + SE: −0.14 + 3.02, t68 = −0.047, p = 0.962). Even though at the group level, children in the demo 
conditions built taller towers than children in the baseline, only 10 out of 52 children in the demo conditions built 
towers that went beyond the maximum height achieved in the baseline. Age also had a significant positive effect 
on tower height: With each standard deviation increase in age (i.e., 4.31 months), average tower height increased 
by 2.91 cm (SE = 1.25, t68 = 2.33, p = 0.022; R2 = 0.07). Sex had no effect on tower height (0.30 + 2.50, t68 = 0.12, 
p = 0.906). In sum, results showed that older children built on average taller towers than younger children and 
that children in both demo conditions built taller towers than those in the baseline.
Tower shape. No child in the baseline made a tripod, thus replicating the finding from Pilot study 2. The 
most common tower shape was a level-1-tower (see Table 1 for descriptions) in the baseline and a level-2-tower in 
both demo conditions. Crucial to our research question, children in both demo conditions made tripods: Three 
children in the full demo and one child in the endstate-only demo condition copied the tripod (three of these 
children were younger than 5 years). A further five children built smaller versions of tripods (level-2-tripods). 
Finally, one child in the endstate-only demo condition built a level-4-tripod. Although this tower exceeded the 
demonstration tripod with regard to height in stick levels (see Table 1), the height in cm did not exceed the tripod 
height as the child’s tower was slightly crooked. A more detailed analysis of children’s tower heights and shapes 
can be found in the Supplementary results, as well as Figures S2, S3, and Table S6.
Similarity to tripod. Participants’ constructions were evaluated by two coders (blind to the hypotheses) 
who judged the similarity of all constructions to the demonstration tripod using a scale from 1 (not similar at all) 
to 7 (very similar). Mean similarity of baseline towers to the tripod was 2.12 (SD = 1.08); for full demo towers it 
was 3.05 (SD = 1.44); for endstate-only demo towers it was 3.05 (SD = 1.61). Condition had a significant effect 
on the similarity of children’s towers to the demonstrated tripod, χ2 = 7.934, df = 2, p = 0.019. Post-hoc Tukey 
tests showed that towers in the full demo condition were rated significantly more similar to the tripod compared 
to the similarity of baseline towers to the tripod (p = 0.036) and the same pattern was found for the towers in 
the endstate-only demo condition (p = 0.023). Ratings for the towers in the two demo conditions did not differ 
significantly (p > 0.999).
Discussion
This study investigated 1) whether young children would be able to use social and/or technical information pro-
vided by a demonstration of cumulative technological design in a tower construction task in order to improve 
their tower building skills and 2) whether some of the children would even spontaneously copy the cumula-
tive technological design. Four- to six-year-olds were assigned to one of three conditions (baseline, full demo, 
endstate-only demo) and were asked to build something as tall as possible out of plasticine and sticks. Children in 
the full demo condition observed the experimenter build cumulative technological design – a tripod – and chil-
dren in the endstate-only demo condition were presented with a ready-made tripod. Pilot study 2 had established 
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that the tripod design was not within children’s spontaneous capacities (as indicated by their baseline perfor-
mance), establishing that the tripod represented cumulative technological design for children that age. We rep-
licated the pilot study by showing that children in the baseline condition did not invent the tripod shape; in 
addition, they neither reached the demonstrated tripod height nor went beyond it.
We also showed that children in both demo conditions built on average taller towers than children in the 
baseline, suggesting that children were able to pick up task-relevant information from the demonstration of the 
culture-dependent product and to improve their performance. This is in line with a recent study on adult social 
learning showing that access to social information can boost a learner’s performance13. Yet, even though towers in 
the demo conditions were on average taller than baseline towers, there was some overlap in tower height between 
the conditions. In contrast, with regard to tower design, there was a clear difference between the baseline and the 
demo conditions: there were no tripods built by any child in the baseline. Thus, the difference between baseline 
and demo conditions with regard to tower height was less dramatic than the difference with regard to tower 
design.
We found that some children (including 4-year-olds) in both demo conditions copied the specific and efficient 
shape of the tripod (three legs), even though they were not instructed to do so. Ratings by independent coders 
confirmed that the towers in the demo conditions were more similar to the demonstrated tripod than were the 
towers in the baseline. Thus, our study demonstrates for the first time that 4- to 6-year-old children are not only 
able to use social and technical information to improve their performance, but that some of these children also 
spontaneously copy an efficient cumulative technological design. Note that we do not claim the ability to copy 
tripods to be present in all children of this age (though it may be – given that we did not tell children to copy the 
tripod, but just asked them to make something as tall as possible). As children did not receive an explicit instruc-
tion or incentive to copy the tripod, our study was a conservative test of whether children can copy cumulative 
technological design and so it was even more impressive to find that some children indeed copied the tripod.
Intriguingly, children in the endstate-only demo condition did not perform differently from children in the 
full demo condition. Despite lacking information about the building process of the tripod, some children in the 
endstate-only demo condition still copied the tripod, suggesting that they were able to recreate the tripod via 
end-state emulation: That is, children were able to identify the necessary building steps from looking at the tripod 
and to recreate it through reverse engineering. This is evidence that 4- to 6-year-olds do not necessarily require 
action information to be able to copy cumulative technological design (i.e., technological culture that is beyond 
Tower 
height in 





Level 4 Level-4-tripod As Tripod, but additional stick on top 1
Level 4 
Total 0/23 (0%) 0/23 (0%) 1/27 (3.7%)
Level 3
Tripod
Three legs, combined with plasticine, 




Three sticks combined vertically on 




Total 2/23 (8.7%) 6/23 (26.1%) 7/27 (25.9%)
Level 2
(modified) Level-2-tripod small tripod (at least three legs – plasticine – stick) 2 2
Level-2-tower
Two sticks combined vertically on 
top of each other (at least one stick 
per level)
4 6 8
Other level-2-constructions 1 2 3
Level 2 
Total 5/23 (21.7%) 10/23 (43.5%) 13/27 (48.1%)
Level 1
Level-1-tower
Ball of plasticine with vertical stick on 
top or two level-1-towers combined 
with sticks combined at top
6 5 4
Hedgehog
Ball of plasticine from which several 





Total 11/23 (47.8%) 7/23 (30.4%) 5/27 (18.5%)
Level 0
Horizontal construction
Construction with sticks and 
plasticine, intentionally built in 
horizontal fashion
3
Plasticine tower Plasticine-only tower 2 1
Level 0 
Total 5/23 (21.7%) 0/23 (0%) 1/27 (3.7%)
Table 1. Distribution of tower height in stick levels and tower shape in the three conditions.
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their own spontaneous abilities). Rather, children were able to use emulation as a social learning mechanism to 
copy the cumulative technological design in our task; imitation of the actions involved proved not necessary.
Even though children were not instructed to copy the tripod, it is worth considering that despite receiving 
action or end-state demonstrations, only a few children actually reproduced the tripod. A number of factors 
might explain this result. First, some children might have lacked the motivation to copy. After all, there was no 
direct incentive for copying the tripod (other than it being tall, of course). In addition, the task was not set in a 
competitive context, so children might have preferred to not copy, but to realize their own ideas and/or explore 
the materials. For example, we had a couple of children who – upon receiving the demonstration – acknowledged 
that the tripod was “a good tower”, but then went on making something completely different; in particular, one 
boy said at this point: “Oh, this is good, but I will make something else”. Still developing fine motor abilities at this 
age probably also contributed to the fact that only few children copied the tripod. Finally, difficulties in causal 
reasoning and insight into the mechanics of the construction task might also have played a role for children’s low 
copying rates. In general, children did not yet have a full understanding of the basic physics involved in the task, 
as several children used only little plasticine for the stand and/or too much for the joints further up. With regard 
to the ability to copy the tripod, it has been shown that 5-year-olds have difficulty using diagonals when building 
towers and that this is due to a still developing ability to combine two axes of a coordinate system61, 62. Given this 
difficulty, some of our participants might have failed to explicitly recognize the tripod legs as an especially stable 
tower base. Despite these limiting factors for children’s performance, we still found that children were able to pick 
up useful knowledge and strategies from the demonstrations, resulting in them making taller towers than the 
baseline children – and some did indeed successfully copy the tripod design.
One might object that the absence of the tripod in the baseline condition does not necessarily mean that the 
tripod represents a culture-dependent trait for 4- to 6-year-old children. It might be possible that even though the 
tripod did not occur in the baseline, it is still within children’s spontaneous abilities, but that environmental and/
or motivational reasons prevented children from showing their “true capacities” (building a tripod). We think 
this is unlikely because 1) children were sufficiently motivated to do the task (they were aware that they could 
win a sticker; the vast majority of children used the full building time; we encouraged children throughout the 
task to make their construction “even taller”), 2) they had sufficient material at their disposal, and 3) the finding 
that children in the baseline condition did not spontaneously build a tripod was confirmed by two independent 
studies (Pilot study 2 in the Supplementary material and the study presented here). In addition, children’s limited 
knowledge about the physics involved in the task (see above) makes it further unlikely that children could invent 
the tripod on their own.
However, one might also argue that the fact that children in the baseline condition did not build a tripod is 
due to the specific instructions we gave: We merely asked children to build “something tall”, and so might have 
increased children’s awareness of the height aspect only without also directly addressing the importance of the 
shape aspect. So given different instructions (e.g., to build “something tall and sturdy”), one might expect some 
baseline children to actually make tripods. However, we would not expect this to happen as in our view the 
instruction to build something tall does not deemphasize the shape aspect. This is because height and shape are 
closely connected: When aiming to build a tall construction, one almost automatically needs to take the shape 
aspect into consideration, as some shapes will be more suitable for building a tall tower than others. Nevertheless, 
we acknowledge that we currently do not know how baseline children would perform if given different instruc-
tions. Future studies are needed to address this question. However, the current study was not designed to answer 
questions related to the instructions, but to test children’s capacity of making a tripod given an instruction to 
make something tall and given the presence or absence of a tripod demonstration.
Experimental studies on the production or transmission of cumulative culture need to determine carefully 
what they define as culture-dependent traits. Previous studies5, 15 have not included control conditions, making it 
“difficult to conclude with certainty that these experiments have demonstrated true cumulative culture”63. While 
not giving us absolute certainty, including a baseline condition helps determine whether a trait (e.g., building a 
tripod) can be easily generated by or tends to be beyond the spontaneous capacity of individuals (see e.g. refs 10 
and 12). Our study is the first to include a baseline condition in the tower construction task. This allowed us to 
1) assess children’s spontaneous, asocial learning capacities, 2) identify a tower representing a culture-dependent 
trait for 4- to 6-year-olds (tripod), and 3) make meaningful comparisons of the performance in the demo condi-
tions against a baseline performance. Even though we could not fully rule out that some children had previous 
experience with a similar game, the weak baseline performance (low height, no tripods) is reassuring that the 
task was sufficiently novel (and difficult) for our participants. We thus established that the tower task is suitable 
for studying the transmission of culture-dependent traits in young children: 4- to 6-year-olds are old enough to 
possess the necessary fine motor abilities to carry out the task, but are still young enough to be able to benefit from 
social information.
Our results are in line with some adult studies showing that emulation is capable of transmitting information 
about culture-dependent traits6, 7, 10. However, it has also been argued3, 26 (and demonstrated experimentally in 
adult studies9, 13, 14, 17) that seeing only an end product may not be sufficient for transmitting cumulative culture. 
One factor possibly influencing whether culture-dependent traits can be transmitted via emulation is the cogni-
tive transparency of the product in question6, 13; however, the mechanisms of this dependency are still unclear. 
It seems that cultural traits exhibiting sufficient cognitive transparency can be acquired via emulation, because 
seeing the end product allows learners to reproduce them via reverse engineering (e.g., building paper planes6, 
spaghetti towers7, baskets10 or plasticine-and-stick tripods (this study)). Similarly, Want and Harris31 proposed 
that if children have sufficient knowledge about the affordances and properties in a task, its “solution can be 
emulated”p12, otherwise children would need to revert to copying actions. The transmission of cultural products 
that are cognitively more opaque (e.g., novel weight-carrying devices9, virtual fishing nets14, foam handaxes17, 
stone tools8 or complex (virtual) totems13) seems to require additional information about the movements of the 
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objects involved and/or of the bodily actions of the demonstrator, so that learners would be able to copy the trait 
via object-movement reenactment (a fine-grained version of emulation learning ref. 64), action copying (roughly: 
imitation ref. 65), or both51. Therefore, it might be possible that culture-dependent traits can be differentiated by 
their cognitive transparency, with this transparency in turn influencing whether emulation is sufficient to trans-
mit the traits.
Our findings raise the question whether young children, at least some of whom our study has shown to be 
capable of copying cumulative technological design, would also be able to transmit and maintain cumulative 
culture among themselves (i.e., across “generations”). Future studies applying the transmission chain paradigm66 
could explore whether cumulative technological design can be maintained along a chain of children or whether 
it would disappear (compare with the method applied in Morgan et al.8). Another question is whether children 
would also be able to produce culture-dependent traits themselves, i.e., whether they could successively build 
upon ever better solutions, thus exhibiting a ratchet effect. It might be that children find this innovative aspect of 
producing culture-dependent traits difficult. Support for this thought comes from our finding that participants 
in our demo conditions were not able to go beyond the height of the demonstrated tripod and that only one 
participant (in the endstate-only demo condition) built a level-4-tripod. Furthermore, research on innovation 
in children demonstrated surprisingly low innovation rates with regard to making tools67 or inventing strategies 
to retrieve more rewards from a puzzle-box68: Children well into their primary school years seem to struggle 
with inventing (better) solutions to new tasks. This might imply that groups of young children might not yet be 
able to show a ratchet effect as continuing limitations on their ability to innovate represents a critical bottleneck 
for the development of a capacity for producing culture-dependent traits [see also refs 69 and 70]. Again, the 
transmission chain method will prove useful for investigating whether generations of children can also produce 
cumulative technological design by adding innovations to existing solutions and then transmitting these. These 
studies will shed more light on the developmental origins of humans’ unique cultural abilities.
Method
Participants. Seventy-three children (34 boys) between 4 years 2 months and 5 years 8 months (Mage = 5 
years 0 months, SD = 4.31 months) were tested in nursery schools and a science museum in a metropolitan area 
in the UK. The ethnic composition was 59% Caucasian, 27% Asian, and 14% Black. Written informed consent was 
obtained by participants’ parents or guardians prior to the study. Children were randomly assigned to the baseline 
(n = 23, 43.5% male), full demo condition (n = 23, 56.5% male), or endstate-only demo condition (n = 27, 40.7% 
male); comparable numbers of children from each testing site were represented in each condition. There were no 
differences in the distribution of age (Kruskal-Wallis-test, χ2(2) = 0.963, p = 0.618) between conditions. Another 
two children were tested but excluded from the analysis as they did not answer the control question correctly. 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Birmingham, UK, STEM Ethical Review Committee. The study 
was carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines.
Procedure. Children were tested individually by the same female experimenter (E). Both were sitting on the 
floor, at a low table (h = 15 cm). To confirm children’s understanding of the concept “taller”, testing started with a 
control question for which children were shown two Playmobil® giraffes of differing sizes and asked to indicate 
which animal was taller. Next, children were told that they would play a game in which they could win a sticker. 
E said: “The game is to build something that is very tall, as tall as you can make it”. E showed children 30 white 
plastic sticks (“lollipop sticks”; length = 15 cm, diameter = 4.5 mm) and 70 g of green plasticine and said: “You can 
use these things to help you build it. You can do anything you like with these things to try to make something very 
tall. You can use all of these [E pointed to lollipop sticks] and all of this [pointed to plasticine]. Also, with this [E took 
plasticine] you can do things like this [E tore one third off of the ball] or this [E tore another third off, then rolled it].”
In the demo conditions, E then said: “Before you start, let me show you what I did earlier!” In the full demo E 
built the tripod (~50–60 sec). Upon completion, she said “Finished!” and looked at the tripod for 5 sec. She then 
placed the tripod on a box ~20 cm behind the table, where it was available for inspection throughout the trial. 
In the endstate-only demo, E fetched a board with a ready-made tripod from behind a barrier next to her and 
placed it on the table. She looked at it for 5 sec and moved it to the box. The rest of the instructions in the demo 
conditions was the same as the instruction children in the baseline were given: E said: “You don’t have much time 
to build something that is as tall as possible”; this was to induce them to be quick as their building time was only 
6 min. E then encouraged children to start building.
During the building phase, E took measurements of children’s towers using a folding rule attached to the table, 
each time participants made an addition to their construction which increased its height and if the construction 
was standing on its own (i.e., children did not stabilize it with their hands). The measurement was done by visual 
judgement, a procedure shown to be sufficiently reliable (Supplementary method: Pilot study 3, Supplementary 
Table S2). When the time was up, children were not allowed to touch the construction anymore. Children who 
held their construction in their hands were asked to place it on the table and those who stabilized it with their 
hands were told to let go. Towers that could not stand on their own had to be placed horizontally on the table. 
Tower height was measured again with a loose folding rule held right next to the construction. Once each partic-
ipant had left the room, E took pictures of the construction (one from each side, one from above).
Coding and statistical analysis. We were interested in whether children in the demo conditions would 
be able to copy the demonstration tripod. In addition, we investigated whether children in the demo conditions 
would build taller towers than children in the baseline condition, and how similar children’s constructions were 
to the demonstrated tripod. For this, we measured three variables: tower height (height of the tallest construction 
a participant built), tower shape of the tower with the maximum height, and similarity to tripod (similarity of a 
child’s construction to the tripod).
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Tower height. For each participant, tower height was measured several times: throughout and at the end of 
the trial. This allowed us to identify each participant’s tallest construction, even if the construction did not “sur-
vive” until the trial end, e.g., because children disassembled it or because it collapsed due to being too instable 
or because children tried to further modify their construction. Since instances of tower collapses often resulted 
from the fact that we encouraged children to use the full building time (i.e., even when children announced 
they were finished we encouraged them to continue building in order to ensure equal construction time among 
participants), we measured tower height continuously to ensure that we made a fair evaluation of children’s per-
formance. Consequently, for some children tower height represented the height of the tower which stood on the 
table at the end of the trial, whereas for other children tower height represented the height of a tower that they had 
built during the trial, but that did not survive until the trial end.
We analyzed whether tower height differed between conditions, using a multiple regression including condi-
tion (baseline, full demo, endstate-only demo) as the predictor, sex (dummy-coded), and age in months (covar-
iate) as control variables, but no interaction as we did not predict one. Prior to fitting the model, we confirmed 
that tower height and age had symmetrical distributions. We z-transformed age to a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1 in order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. We checked the following model diagnos-
tics: normal distribution and residuals plotted against fitted values (to check for homoscedasticity of residuals), 
DFFits and DFBetas, Leverage, Cook’s distance, Generalized Variance Inflation Factor, and Levène’s test of equal 
error variances. There were no obvious deviations from the model assumptions. To determine the effect of con-
dition, we compared the fit of the full model with the fit of a model lacking condition as a predictor. The model 
and the diagnostics were run in R (version 3.2.3 ref. 71), the Generalized Variance Inflation Factor was calculated 
with the function “vif ” of the R package “car”72. Sample size for this analysis was 73; the alpha level for all analyses 
in this study was 0.05.
Tower shape. The shape of the tallest tower was coded offline by E.R. based on photos and video stills. First, 
we first determined the height structure of the tower in what we labelled stick levels (Table 1, first column): We 
counted how many sticks were vertically combined on top of each other (“combining” meaning two sticks joined 
vertically with a piece of plasticine, while an overlap of up to half the length of a stick was allowed). This allowed 
us to group the towers into four categories: level-0-constructions (towers that were smaller than the height of one 
stick, e.g., towers lying on their side or constructions consisting only of plasticine); level-1-constructions (con-
structions with one (or more) sticks placed vertically into a plasticine base); level-2-constructions (comprising any 
constructions in which two sticks were combined on top of each other); and – applying the same logic – level-
3- and level-4-constructions (the tripod thus fell into the level-3-constructions group). We further grouped the 
towers within each stick level category based on their shape, resulting in one to three shape categories per stick 
level (Table 1, columns 2 and 3).
Similarity to Tripod. Similarity to tripod was coded based on the method used by Caldwell & Millen5. Two 
raters, blind to the research hypotheses, coded pictures of all the towers (i.e., towers at trial end and – for chil-
dren whose tallest tower did not survive until trial end – additionally the tallest tower from throughout the 
trial) with regard to their similarity to the demonstrated tripod, using a scale from 1 (not similar at all) to 7 (very 
similar). Scaled points 2–6 were not labelled specifically. For each participant, raters were given one picture of 
the participant’s construction, which was to be compared with a picture of the demonstration tripod (presented 
in five pictures, to show also the slight, but unavoidable variance of the demonstrated tripods) and asked “How 
similar is this [image] to the constructions on the 5 pictures?” The ratings of the two coders correlated signifi-
cantly (r = 0.828, p < 0.001) and the strength of the relationship between the two ratings was similar to the one in 
Caldwell & Millen5.
To determine whether the towers in the demo conditions were rated as more similar to the tripod than the 
towers in the baseline, we fitted a Linear Mixed Model73 into which we included condition as a fixed effect and 
random intercepts for participant and rater (to account for the fact that each rater and each participant contrib-
uted more than one data point). We also included a random slope for condition (manually dummy-coded) on 
rater74. The model was fitted using the function lmer of the R-package lme475. To allow for a likelihood test, we 
fitted the model using Maximum Likelihood (rather than Restricted Maximum Likelihood ref. 76). We checked 
for normal distribution and homoscedasticity of the residuals by visually inspecting a qq-plot and the residuals 
plotted against the fitted values and found no obvious violation of these assumptions. The significance of condi-
tion was determined by comparing the full model against a reduced model (lacking the variable condition) by 
a likelihood ratio test (R function anova with argument test set to “Chisq”77). Post-hoc Tukey tests were carried 
out using the R package multcomp78. The sample size for this model was a total of 178 ratings made on 89 towers 
(two ratings per tower).
Data accessibility. The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are available at the UK 
Data Service ReShare repository, https://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-852706.
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